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Symposium - Crisis and Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union 
Cormac Mac Amhlaigh 
University of Edinburgh 
 
The ratification difficulties associated with the Maastricht Treaty – not least the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht’s (BVerfG) assertion of the supremacy of the German constitution 
during German ratification1 – and its creation of a ‘Europe of Bits and Pieces’,2 signalled a 
watershed in the European integration project and a move away from the federalist-oriented 
‘permissive consensus’ which had marked the preceding era.3 Even if the idea of crisis in 
European integration was not new,4 it is no exaggeration to say that Maastricht was the 
beginning of an era of semi-permanent crisis in European integration.5 
Crisis can, however, be ‘salutary’.6 The post-Maastricht era was marked by a 
flourishing of creative new thinking about the integration project in the legal academy, offering 
fresh insights and ideas about European legal integration beyond the conventional neo-
functionalist and federalist accounts.7 Perhaps one of the most enduring of these new 
                                                        
1 Brunner v European Union Treaty (Case 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2959/92 JZ 1993, 1100) [1994] 1 CMLR 57 
(Maastricht).    Also, Denmark rejected the treaty in a referendum and was only persuaded to ratify after opt-
outs were secured. 
2 D Curtin, ‘The Constitutional Structure of the European Union:  A Europe of Bits and Pieces’ (1993) 30 
Common Market Law Review 17 
3 L Hooghe and G Marks, ‘A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to 
Constraining Dissensus’ (2009) 39 British Journal of Political Science 1 
4 Previous events such as the failure of the European Defence treaty and the ‘empty chair’ crisis posed their own 
distinctive challenges to the project.  See generally,   A Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and 
State Power from Messina to Maastricht (UCL Press : 1998).   
5 Hot on the heels of the Maastricht aftermath came the Nice reforms with an Irish ‘no’ at the first attempt, the 
failure of the constitutional Treaty in 2005 as well as the difficult ratification of Lisbon Treaty (involving 
another Irish ‘no’). 
6 N Walker, ‘A Constitutional Reckoning’ (2006) 13:2 Constellations 140-150, 149. 
7  See for example M Cappelletti, M Seccombe, J Weiler (eds), Integration through Law: Europe and the 
American Federal Experience / Vol. 1, Methods, Tools and Institutions (Wde Gruyter 1985); C Mac Amhlaigh, 
'Concepts of Law in Integration through law' in D Augenstein (ed), ‘Integration through Law’ Revisited: The 
Making of the European Polity (Ashgate Pub 2012); G de Búrca, ‘Rethinking Law in Neofunctionalist Theory’ 
(2005) 12 Journal of European Public Policy 310. 
‘dynamics’ of legal integration,8 was MacCormick’s constitutional pluralism.  When Neil 
MacCormick first articulated his preliminary thoughts on the idea of constitutional pluralism 
in his 1992 Chorley lecture at the London School of Economics, European integration was in 
the throes of the Maastricht crisis.9  His account of heterarchically interacting legal systems, 
seemed distinctively apt to account for the post-Maastricht fallout, and in particular, the 
BVerfG’s assertion of the supremacy of the German basic law in its interactions with EU law.10  
It has also spawned a particularly fertile area of scholarship, with the idea spreading well 
beyond its original domicile of the relationship between EU law and state law.11  
This symposium returns to the roots of the idea of constitutional pluralism in the context 
of crisis in European integration.  It examines the extent to which the idea, forged in the crucible 
of the crisis-ridden Maastricht era, is suited to the (in many ways radically different) crises 
facing the project today. The frequency and intensity of crises affecting the European 
integration project since 2008 are arguably unprecedented in its history.  The sovereign debt 
and euro crisis; the migration crisis precipitated by the Syrian war; the rule of law crisis in 
certain post-2004 Member States; secessionist attempts in Scotland and Catalonia; and the rise 
of Eurosceptic populism across the bloc culminating in the trauma of a Member State seeking 
to leave the Union for the first time (following the UK’s 2016 referendum on EU membership), 
will surely result in the post-2008 period being marked in the annals of European integration 
history as the Union’s darkest hour to date. 
                                                        
8  J .Shaw, ‘European Union Legal Studies in Crisis? Towards a New Dynamic’ (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 231 
9 The piece opens with a reference to debates about sovereignty in the House of Commons during UK 
ratification of the Maastricht treaty.  N MacCormick, ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’ (1993) 56 The Modern Law 
Review 1. 
10 As explored by MacCormick in his article on the Maastricht judgment itself:  N MacCormick, ‘The 
Maastricht Urteil – Sovereignty Now!’ (1995) 1(3) European Law Journal 259-266.  
11 Neil Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 The Modern Law Review 317; Matej Avbelj 
and Jan Komárek (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart 2012); T. Flynn, The 
Triangular Constitution:  Constitutional Pluralism in Ireland, the EU and the ECHR (Hart 2019). 
 Each of the Symposium contributions examines a particular crisis of the post-2008 era 
through the lens of constitutional pluralism, questioning the extent to which constitutional 
pluralism helps or hinders the management, and ultimately, the resolution of that crisis.  
Lawrence’s contribution looks at the migration crisis from the viewpoint of 
constitutional pluralism. She emphasizes the idea of constitutional pluralism as discourse and 
unearths the hidden normative commitments embedded in different models which involve 
implicit claims about the limits of the toleration of difference by the EU legal order, which she 
analyses in the context of the Hungarian Constitutional court’s rejection of the EU’s refugee 
distribution system. Kelemen and Pech’s contribution looks at the rule of law crisis in Hungary 
and Poland. They decry the misuse of constitutional pluralism by their populist governments 
to centralise power in their domestic systems and defy EU law. They robustly and polemically 
lay the blame for these developments at the feet of the model of constitutional pluralism itself 
as giving succour to authoritarian regimes, concluding that it is no longer suited to the new 
threats to European integration from these developments. 
 Mac Amhlaigh and Wilkinson focus on the role of sovereignty in the Brexit crisis and 
the eurozone crisis respectively. Mac Amhlaigh emphasizes the resolutely post-sovereign 
nature of constitutional pluralism, arguing that it provides both a good account of the pre-Brexit 
relationship between the UK and EU as well as, perhaps counterintuitively, the post-Brexit 
relationship. Notwithstanding the assertions of sovereignty which accompanied the Brexit 
vote, he argues that the post-sovereignty of constitutional pluralism will continue to capture 
the post-Brexit future of EU/UK relations as well as the future of EU institutional reform. 
Conversely, Wilkinson claims that pre-Maastricht integration marked a period of repressed 
sovereignty suited to constitutional pluralism, which was subsequently liberated in the post-
Maastricht era as exemplified by the BVerfG’s Maastricht judgement.  However, this resurgent 
sovereignty is of an asymmetric and distorted form and is clearly evident in the management 
of the eurocrisis by powerful EU Member states.   
 As a model of European legal integration, constitutional pluralism explicitly 
highlighted and embraced the tensions in the integration project.  These tensions have been 
brutally foregrounded since 2008, and the  individual contributions to the symposium raise the 
question of whether constitutional pluralism’s delicate balancing of these tensions can be 
sustained in the uncertain post-crisis future of integration.   
 
 
